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talk a bit about what you see as the role of philosophy in
contemporary society? What does philosophical work have
to do with our political, ethical, and everyday lives?
JM: That is a really important and a really difficult question.
One of the results of the professionalization and narrow
specialization of philosophers is that our work often becomes
too far removed from ordinary affairs, too detached from
the lives and concerns of ordinary people. But we have
an obligation to connect our philosophical reflections (no
matter how abstract they get) back to real life and real
people; not that each of us needs to do this in every essay
or in every class, but we collectively have the responsibility
to show how our critical reflections bear on people’s lives
and problems. For me, philosophy should be a critical
activity that offers new avenues for thinking and acting to
people. It is in this sense that I am drawn to philosophers
like Wittgenstein and Jane Addams, whose philosophical
reflections begin and end with actual practices and people’s
lived experiences; that should the starting point and the end
point of our philosophical exercise and in between what we
need to produce and work with is perplexity, that is, a deep
interrogation of how we do things and how we think and
feel, an interrogation that interrupts the flow of familiarity
and obviousness of our lives, making the familiar unfamiliar
and the obvious bizarre. The emphasis placed on the critical
potential of perplexity by philosophers like Addams and
Wittgenstein (and of course many others since Socrates)
points in the direction of processes of self-estrangement
and self-questioning in which we look at ourselves with fresh
eyes, and we become capable of calling into question things
we have taken for granted and have become invisible to us,
being then able to recognize limitations and possibilities for
transformation and improvement. Of course, making people
perplexed is not enough. Philosophers (in collaboration with
other scholars and also with artists and activists) need to find
ways of making that perplexity productive in leading people
to think and act better, not just in more sophisticated ways,
but also and more importantly in ethically, politically, and
epistemically responsible ways. Ways of doing this can be
found in the critical methodologies of feminist theory, queer
theory, and critical race theory. These are some of the most
innovative theories philosophy has offered in recent years
and they have a tremendous transformative potential for our
political, ethical, and everyday lives.
NC: As we’ve discussed, in your written work you actively
and critically interrogate philosophical, political, and
epistemological assumptions. In doing so, you engage in
this important work of making your readers more perplexed
while asking them to think and act in more responsible ways.
How do your work in teaching and mentoring play into this
practice of philosophy for you?
JM: I cannot think of philosophy without teaching as an
essential part, whether in the classroom, reading groups,
workshops, conferences, or in more informal ways.
Philosophy is a self-critical exercise, but for me it is not
something that can be done by individuals in isolation
because it requires a practice of mutual interrogation and
challenge; it involves learning from others and their critical
exercises as well as offering our own reflections for the
learning of others. One thing that I think philosophy as a
critical activity should help us do is to bring teaching and
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activism closer together, so that our philosophical activities
become oriented toward the critique and transformation of
both theories and practices at the same time. This aspiration
is something that have in common with all the authors I draw
from: pragmatists, feminists, queer theorists, and critical
race theorists. The ways in which these different theorists
practice philosophy provide useful paradigms or models for
how to do philosophy in a critical and transformative way,
working toward making a difference in people’s lives.
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For readers interested in acquiring insight into the plight
of people of color in academic philosophy, particularly
the predicament of African Americans and Latino/as in the
field, Reframing the Practice of Philosophy is incredibly
illuminating while simultaneously upsetting. Each essay
tackles tough questions of inclusion and exclusion in ways
that reveal an assortment of biases and structural flaws latent
to professional philosophy. “The attempt to explore and
explicate the lack of African Americans and Latinos/as in the
field of philosophy,” Yancy writes, “actually resulted in a much
broader and comprehensive text that uncovered complex
and multifaceted issues such as alienation, institutional
prejudices, insidious racism, canonical exclusion, linguistic
exclusion, nonrecognition, disrespect, white hegemony
and power, discursive silencing, philosophical territorial
arrogance, and indignation” (2). The volume is a powerful,
self-conscious, and exigent analysis of one of the whitest
fields in academia. More honest conversations like this must
take place in order for our field to reinvent itself along more
equitable lines, assuming that this is indeed a collective goal.
Almost every essay addresses one or more of the above
issues through insightful argumentation infused with
autobiographic prose—a hallmark of several of Yancy’s
volumes. The contributors comprise a prominent list of
active Latino/a and Black voices in professional philosophy,
many of whom specialized in more “mainstream” areas of
philosophy prior to delving into such topics as philosophy of
race, feminist theory, Latin American philosophy, Caribbean
philosophy, Africana philosophy, and more. Through their
efforts, the volume asks meta-philosophical questions about
the nature and practice of philosophical inquiry in societies
shaped by legacies of racism and other forms of widespread,
systematic oppression. How has the history of classical,
institutional, and non-conscious forms of racism, particularly
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that which targets Blacks and Hispanics, or, for the same
reason, the blind commitment to a tradition that continually
marginalizes minorities, women, and the philosophical topics
pertinent to both, affected the conditions that make possible
philosophical inquiry? How have the range of questions
philosophers are willing to ask, the type of books they read,
the kinds of people they listen to been shaped by the history
of these forms of oppression and ignorance? This range of
questioning alone makes the volume worth picking up.
Philosophers of color alive today will find the text a useful
resource for dealing with some of the pressures and
frustrations of academic life. In fact, the volume may serve
as a springboard for voicing one’s opinion and (most likely)
similar experiences. As Yancy explains, “I began to see just
how important the text had become beyond the scope of
low numbers, particularly in terms of the text’s forwardlooking dimensions. The text constitutes an important site—a
textual balm of sorts—for blacks and Latino/as currently
pursuing degrees in philosophy and who, as a result, may
feel isolated, ‘out of place,’ and marginalized. Moreover, the
text speaks to future philosophers of color who might need
confirmation of their sanity, a collective voice that says, ‘We
also know your pain, your blues’” (2).
The dedication to “philosophers of color not yet born” adds
a sense of urgency to the topics discussed throughout the
volume, especially in light of changing demographics in the
United States, which will undoubtedly bring more nonwhites
into philosophy and expand the range of philosophical
inquiry. If the critical thinking skills acquired in a philosophical
education are a good thing, then more should be done
to ensure that vast segments of the population, if not the
majority, do not feel alienated from this field of study (this
might actually serve to philosophy’s benefit in terms of
institutional support and funding).
In terms of Latin American philosophy, Jorge J. E. Gracia
describes the canonical marginalization of this sub-discipline
as follows: “Latin American philosophy is a good example of
a philosophy systematically excluded from both the Western
and world philosophical canons as these are conceived in
the United States. This claim . . . may be easily documented
by looking at histories of philosophy, reference works,
anthologies, philosophical societies, evaluating tools of
philosophy as a field of learning, education programs such as
the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) seminars,
Ph.D. dissertations in philosophy and common areas of
specialization in the discipline, and the college curriculum (in
the United States, philosophy is generally taught only at the
college level)” (89). In his essay, Gracia quickly dismantles
a veritable list of objections that would justify the exclusion
of Latin American philosophy from the Western canon.
However, the real reason, according to Gracia, stems from a
blind commitment to tradition.
Ofelia Schutte summarizes the reasons for the marginalization
of Latinos/as in professional philosophy with three problems:
(1) the Anglo/Eurocentric orientation of philosophy, (2) the
desire by “prestigious” philosophers to safeguard prestige
(sometimes talked about in terms of “rigor”), and (3) the
“we” of philosophy, or the fact that the mainstream academic
philosophical community is a rather monochromatic
bunch where people of color often feel second-class or
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unwelcomed (unless, of course, people of color are willing
to “play the game” as it is). All of these arguments, Schutte
explains, depend upon “extra-philosophical” factors that
reveal implicit biases against Blacks and Latino/as in ways
that perpetuate the whiteness of philosophy.
Charles Mills explains that the entire discipline of philosophy is
“inimical to the recognition of race.” He continues, “Philosophy
is supposed to be abstracting away from the contingent, the
corporeal, the temporal, the material, to get at necessary,
spiritual, eternal, ideal truths” (60). Much of the difficulties
engendered by the incorporation of marginalized voices
and topics has to do with the subject matter of philosophical
thought and its supposed universality. Philosophical truths
are supposed to escape the realm of the particular and rise
to a level of abstraction beyond cultural, ethnic, and racial
particularities (59–60). With one intriguing sentence Bill E.
Lawson captures the essence of this sentiment when he writes,
“when race comes in the room, logic goes out the window”
(197). The idea that race and logic are incompatible can mean
that when discussions of race take place, conversation quickly
deteriorates to irrational, emotion-driven fights. Put differently
(and in terms that garner instantaneous philosophical capital
in some circles), there cannot be any logos when speaking
about ethnos.
Thus, the volume highlights the subtle and not-so-subtle
prejudices held by professional philosophers. Besides
historical contingency, there are no good reasons as to why
the concerns of people of color are ignored. Although their
work aspires towards levels of abstraction that make universal
truth claims possible, philosophers are nonetheless born
into particular societies, cultures, and histories, all of which
yield an assortment of racist or sexists leanings, cultural
insensitivities, bias and jingoism, etc. Yancy thus endeavors
to show how it is the case that “blacks and Latinos/as often
experience nonacademic spaces and academic spaces as a
distinction without a difference” (3).
Along these lines, the critical dimensions of the text are found
in aggregate. Individually, the question of marginalization or
specific examples of racist/sexist statements and attitudes
may appear to be scandalous moral failures, the kind of
material that gets talked about on national blogs and at
APA meetings. Viewed piecemeal, these incidents and
complaints appear sporadic and incidental. However, the
forms of marginalization experienced by Latino/as and
African Americans are manifold, often intersecting and
widespread—this volume serves as proof. By allowing
prominent thinkers to voice their experiences and concerns
Yancy’s text allows for the emergence of patterns of
systematic exclusion that venture beyond the incidental:
“As the text continued to take shape, what also began to
emerge was a parallel between many of the issues that
black and Latino/a bodies experience within the everyday
world of social perception as linked to pervasive de facto
racism, and the refined and intellectually highfalutin world
of professional philosophy” (2). Reiterating the goal of the
text, Yancy writes, “[The] goal was to create a critical space
where both groups [African Americans and Latino/as] would
come together to discuss critically a collectively important
defining theme, a common problem—our marginalization
within the profession of philosophy, which is one of those
‘inappropriate’ philosophical subjects” (1).
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Yancy revels in a bit of ambiguity at the end of this quote.
Not only is the subject matter of philosophy at stake, i.e., the
range of questions philosophers think about and the ways
in which philosophical issues pertinent to Latino/as and
African Americans are often relegated to the philosophical
wayside, but also at stake is the question of philosophical
agency, i.e., whether or not Blacks and Hispanics constitute
true philosophical “subjects.” Central to the volume is the
assumption that philosophical inquiry is pertinent to what it
means to be human, a natural outgrowth of having critical
reflective skills. To deny the ability to practice philosophy,
or to impose terms that make a fetish of rigor, tradition, and
prestige, is to deny human subjectivity and autonomy. It is
to say to Blacks and Latino/as that philosophy cannot take
place on their terms.
Donna-Dale Marcano’s wonderful contribution, “ReReading Plato’s Symposium Through the Lens of a Black
Woman,” lends support at this point. Marcano’s reading of
Plato’s Symposium compares the character Alcibiades as
a stand in for black women in philosophy. Both attempt to
negotiate their relationship with philosophy (or Socrates) in
ways that cannot divest themselves of the particularities of
their existence. She writes, “Does philosophy fail some of
us then? Yes! It fails those of us who understand that we
are particularly situated. We are particularly situated in our
desires, in our communities, in our race, in our genders,
in our loves. For this, black women’s intellectual work that
engages their racialized and gendered perspectives and
which aims to take account of the social and political context
in which these perspectives take shape are often viewed as
so particular as to be of no philosophical value” (232).
Jacqueline Scott’s essay, “Toward a Place Where I Can Bring
All of Me,” speaks towards this notion when comparing the
“traditional” view of the self as afforded by the history of
philosophy, and the more complex, “impure” understanding
of the self provided by life. She writes, “We need to conceive
of a philosophy that is in the service of life—in the service
of the complex, multifarious, incoherent lives most people
really live, and we need to convey this in both our research
and teaching” (220).
Nelson Maldonado-Torres explains the way in which his
studies of Frantz Fanon allowed him to approach a conception
of “decolonization as first philosophy,” which breaks with
the idea that some people are subjects of knowledge while
others are mere objects in need of dominance. He writes,
“the fundamental axes of reflection about human reality
are grounded in the human-to-human relation, and that the
primary questions out of which philosophy itself emerges
are motivated not so much by wonder in the face of nature,
but by desire for inter-human contact and scandal in the
face of the violation of that possibility. This means that the
telos of thinking, if there is any, is the struggle against
dehumanization, understood as the affirmation of sociality
and the negation of its negation. I refer to the negation of
sociality as coloniality and to its negation and overcoming as
decoloniality” (261).
Lawson writes something similar: “Our colleagues are
not idiots. They are trained to solve problems. Like most
people they will work to solve a problem if they think that
it is important. If they think that racism in the profession is
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a problem, they will begin to work with their own and their
colleague’s racism and sexism. No person of color can force
them to work to change the game or their attitudes. If they
think that blacks are indeed inferior intellectually, then they
will feel no compulsion to change the game” (197). Drawing
from John Hope Franklin’s “The Dilemma of the American
Negro Scholar,” Lawson continues by stating that if there
are white philosophers passionate about the elimination of
disrespectful practices in academic philosophy, they must
realize that the respect owed to black scholars is connected
to the type of respect black people receive outside of
academia. In a powerful line, Lawson writes, “It has been
a truism that a black person being respected in one arena
of social interaction gives us no hint of how he or she will
be respect [sic] in others. However, respect must begin at
home” (197).
By rethinking the agents responsible for philosophical
thought, the volume attempts to “reframe” the practice of
philosophy. This process “steps back and takes another
look, realizing that the current frame excludes all that
does not fit with the demarcated limits of that frame.” “In
fact,” as Yancy continues, “that which is outside the frame
is constituted as . . . unintelligible and ersatz. This form of
framing actually deforms, delimits, and truncates the very
power of philosophical imaginings. To reframe the current
practices of philosophy, then, functions to reveal the limits
of its current practices, its current assumptions, its current
conceptual allegiances, and its current self-images. The aim
is to expand the hermeneutic horizon of what is possible,
philosophically” (5).
Yet the process of reframing philosophy remains difficult
when philosophers inherit forms of prejudice and ignorance
ingrained throughout their societies. Yancy writes,
“Philosophical academic spaces are . . . continuous with
everyday, politically invested, racially grounded, prejudicial,
social spaces. Such normative (white) academic spaces
are shot through with much of the same racist toxicity that
configures black and brown bodies as outside the normative
(white) Demos” (2). Returning to Lawson’s essay, his point was
to note that African Americans will not acquire philosophical
clout until Black people, as a whole, are respected as
full, rational agents. This starts at home and in our own
departments. Returning to Maldonado-Torres’s essay, his
understanding of philosophy necessitates reciprocal social
exchanges that assume co-subjectivity; to deny this is to
colonize the mind of others and even the self (since one is
denies the possibility for dialogue and instead supplies only
monologue). Returning to Scott’s essay, philosophy should
be a place where a person does not have to sacrifice one’s
cultural, ethnic, or racial particularity to reach standards set
by racist.
Obviously, white allies will find much value in the text. More
importantly, white philosophers who fail to see the importance
of diversification would also benefit from reading the text.
At the very least, the volume succeeds in placing the onus
upon those who fail to see the importance of philosophical
diversification to justify their stance. Along these lines, several
contributors provide interesting arguments that explain why
academic philosophy, as a whole, fails to take seriously the
philosophical questions pertinent to people of color or even
make difficult one’s personal existence inside the field. One
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could only imagine how the text would be improved if it went
beyond a black/brown binary to include people of Asian and
indigenous descent (among others). Nonetheless, that form
of exclusion sets the stage for a new volume expanding this
discussion in ways beyond the confines of this volume.

articles
Seriousness, Irony, and Cultural Politics:
A Defense of Jorge Portilla
Francisco Gallegos
georgetown universit y

Nearly sixty years after the publication of the Phenomenology
of Relajo, the work of Jorge Portilla (1919–1963) seems
poised for a rediscovery. Reading the first English-language
translation of the text—published just last year as the
appendix to Carlos Alberto Sánchez’s excellent scholarly
treatment—one cannot help but wonder how the text
remained untranslated for so long.1 Portilla’s work is full of
novel and profound insights into topics that are both timeless
and timely, including the nature of values, the meaning of
freedom, and the proper use of passive resistance in the
struggle for liberation.

many of our cultural practices either collaborate with this
oppression or seem powerless to challenge it effectively,
the relajiento begins to look like a heroic freedom fighter,
engaged in a kind of civil disobedience of the cultural
sphere. Colonial oppression, Sánchez notes, protected itself
by imposing “values of sobriety and order and progress,”
and these values have been “kept alive today as a power
that itself colonizes.”4 In this context, the behavior of the
relajiento should be seen as “a creative response of the
marginal in their marginality, whose resistance to value is,
truly, an act of defiance.”5
Sánchez hopes that although the relajiento’s apathy and
disruptions may undermine traditional cultural practices,
this destruction might clear the way for new and better
possibilities to emerge. Citing Jean-Francois Lyotard’s call
in The Postmodern Condition “to increase displacement
in the games, and even to disorient it, in such a way as to
make an unexpected ‘move,’” Sánchez suggests that the
relajiento’s actions might be “such a displacement and such
an unexpected ‘move.’”6

The Phenomenology of Relajo (1966) centers upon Portilla’s
critique of a well-known figure in Mexican culture known as
the relajiento. As a first approximation, we can think of the
relajiento as a kind of “class clown,” a person who refuses
to take anything seriously and never misses an opportunity
to disrupt a group practice. He is an irrepressible jokester,
beloved and feared for his ability to derail any meeting,
performance, or party with his loud and obnoxious antics.

In the meantime, Sánchez says, the relajiento’s “suspension
of seriousness” may at least bring peace of mind. The
relajiento may have found a way to avoid being filled with
anxiety about the enormous problems confronting the post9/11 world and the dizzying complexity of today’s sociopolitical landscape. As “an expression of that world and those
anxieties,” he says, the relajiento “can survive the angst and
terror through acts of suspension which might, possibly, as
for the ancient skeptics, bring ataraxia, or tranquility.”7 This
relajiento’s acts of suspension are thus a way to “postpone”
serious commitment “for a future time”—a time when taking
cultural practices seriously will not involve buying into an
oppressive ideology, and may actually contribute to genuine
liberation.8

In Portilla’s view, Mexican culture has always had great
affection for the jokester. But Portilla worried that what was
once a delightful cultural idiosyncrasy was becoming a
dangerous cultural habit that threatened the entire society.
More and more Mexican men were becoming relajientos,
he thought, and their refusal to take anything seriously
was becoming truly nihilistic. Portilla worried that “the best
representatives” of his generation were squandering their
talents, and “in the midst of perpetual laughter . . . giving
themselves up, really, to a slow process of self-destruction.”2

Wrestling with Sánchez’s challenge has inspired me to dig
deeper into Portilla’s work. While I find Sanchez’s re-reading
of the relajiento compelling, looking at Portilla from the
perspective of answering this challenge has unearthed
aspects of Portilla’s rich text that I had not appreciated
previously. As a result, I have come to believe that there
are a few good points to be made in response to Sánchez’s
criticism. I will try to outline those points here in the hopes of
contributing to this important, ongoing dialogue about how
best to understand the relajiento.

Sánchez’s treatment of the Phenomenology illuminates
how creatively Portilla drew upon European philosophical
influences to address this distinctively Latin American issue,
and he is quite persuasive in his argument that this ostensibly
provincial topic has great relevance for a wider audience. But
while Sánchez is a capable champion of Portilla’s work, he
concludes his book by offering some challenging thoughts
to his readers, suggesting that Portilla may have been
shortsighted in his unmitigated rejection of the relajiento.

In this essay, then, I will defend Portilla’s criticism of the
relajiento. I argue that Portilla was right to see the relajiento’s
behavior as counterproductive in the fight for liberation from
ideological oppression. Genuine freedom, in Portilla’s view
and mine, requires seriousness and sincerity; it requires
wholehearted participation in cultural practices that one
finds truly valuable.

Sánchez proposes an alternative reading of the relajiento’s
disruptive behavior that “reconceives it as an act of defiance
before the colonial legacy . . . and against the axiological
imperialism which that legacy instituted.”3 The point here,
I take it, is that when we consider the immense legacy of
colonial oppression facing our world, and consider how
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In trying to work out Portilla’s reasoning for this conclusion,
I will suggest some new ways of understanding Portilla’s
analysis of values and freedom. I suggest that Portilla sees
values as neither self-standing nor subjectively posited;
instead, he thinks that values “emerge” in a mood-like
way. Moreover, Portilla thinks that the values most crucial
for achieving genuine freedom—the values that unify an
individual’s experiences into a coherent and meaningful
PAGE 11

